Heidegger's response is that with regard to the other only a noninvasive mode of helping others is to decide to 'let the other be' in its alterity from itself, which is to say, in its authentic inauthenticity or most proper impropriety: 'The resoluteness toward itself first brings Da-sein to the possibility of letting the others who are with it 'be' in their ownmost potentiality-of-being, and also discloses that potentiality in concern which leaps ahead and frees. Resolute Da-sein can become the 'conscience' of others.' This means that there is no positive, affirmative, 'political,' or 'ethical' mode of relation to others that doesn't co-open [co-aprirli] to them, a co-opening of oneself to the common responsibility for one's own proper care (ours and theirs, inextricably linked). Neither are we dealing here with 'making' a gift but of 're-placing' (freigeben) in the other the possibility of being-with in donation, or the self-sacrifice (dedizione) of being. The community is and needs to remain constitutively impolitical in the sense that we can correspond to our being in common only to the degree in which we keep it away from every demand for historical-empirical actualization, that is, if we do not take on for ourselves the roles of subjects: the community cannot have 'subjects' because it is the community itself that constitutes--that deconstructs--subjectivity in the form of its alteration.
[Roberto Esposito, Communitas: The Origin and Destiny of Community, page 97)